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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
MAARTIN W. KELLER and
JOAN KELLER,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
vs.
MAXINE PATRAKIS,
Defendant and
Respondent

Case No.
11834

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by plaintiffs against the defendant for damages as a result of personal injuries and
property damage sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of an automobile accident.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial of the instant case was held on the 18th
and 19th days of June, 1969, in the District Court
of Salt Lake County before the Honorable Marcellus
K. Snow, with a jury. On June 19, 1969, the jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant and against
the plaintiffs for no cause of action. Subsequently,
the plaintiffs made a motion for a new trial, which
motion was denied on August 18, 1969.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks to have the order of the
court below denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial
affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with the appellants' statement of the facts, but there are additional facts which
were not set out in appellants' brief and which are
pertinent to the issues.
The car driven by 'the defendant was a new car,
having been purchased in July of 1967 (R. 105), and
was driven only around town for the three-month
period up to the time of the accident (R. 129).
During the course of the morning's drive prior
to the accident the brakes squeaked and grabbed
somewhat, but they stopped the car ( R. 109). The
defendant thought that they must be getting moisture
in them, but didn't give it a second thought because
it was a new car ( R. 115). The brakes had always
functioned all right before, and although she thought
the moisture might be having some effect on them,
she did not know that 'the rain would affect the brakes
so that they would fail in the manner that they did
(R. 116).
Upon approaching the intersection when defen·
dant saw plaintiffs' vehicle stopped at the semaphore,
she let off on the accelerator and started to slow
down. Miss Patrakis estimated that she had slowed
down to 20 miles per hour when she was about 150
2

fl'd from the intel'section (R. 108). She applied her

brakes lightly at first, and when she felt she was close
enough, at about 75 feet from the plaintiff's car, she
:1pplied them harder. She was surprised and stunned
when the brakes did not work, and attempted to apply
tlw foot emergency brake in order to avoid hitting
the µlain tiffs' car ( R. 112).
In her conversation with the investigating officer the defendant told him about the brakes, how they
:1queaked and failed to work (R. 111), and Mr. Keller
:Jso testified he heard her tell the officer the brakes
didn't work.

After the officer had completed his investigation he had the defendant pump the brakes on her
\'ehicle, and then allowed her to drive home. The defendant testified that she did not think the officer
would have let her drive if there had been any question about the safety of her doing so (R. 118).
On the Monday following the accident Mr. Patrakis took the car to a mechanic, where the brakes were
ehecked and found to be all right (R. 130).

ARGUMENT

THE "BRAKE FAILURE" INSTRUCTIONS
WERE A CORRECT STATEMENT OF THE
LAW AND WERE WARRANTED BY THE
EVIDENCE; TH E RE F 0 R E, THE TRIAL
COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS'
FOR A NEW TRIAL.

Aftel' the evidence was in, the trial judge gave

hti following jury instructions:

1

INSTRUCTION NO. 9
An automobile driver who has no notice
of faulty brakes and could not discover the de.
feet through the exercise of reasonable care is
not responsible for any damage caused by
brake failure.
·
If a driver knows or should know of such
a defect; however, and takes no precautionary
measures, he is liable for the consequences. ·
INSTRUCTION NO. 10
You are instructed that in this case defendant claims a defense of faulty brakes. The
defendant has the burden of proving tha:t the
brakes were, in fact, faulty, that defendant
had no notice of the fact that they were faulty
or could not have reasonably anticipated that
the brakes would or might not be effective in
slowing or stopping her vehicle under all of the
circumstances and conditions which then and
there existed.
The statement of the law set forth in Instructions 9 and 10 is correct, and this is established in
the case of White vs. Pinney, 99 Ut. 484, 108 P.2d
249 (1940).
Appellant has conceded that the instructions are
a correct statement of the law, but is arguing that
there was no evidence to support a theory of the case
which would warrant the instructions. More specifically, appellant contends that there must be some evidence of a defective condition in the brakes in order
for the "brake failure" instructions to be given, and
4

asserts that defendant introduced no evidence supporting a defective condition.
Respondent submits that the instructions were
properly given, as there was sufficient evidence to
;-;upport the defendant's theory of the case. The defense was based on a sudden brake failure caused by
wet brake linings. The defendant was alone in the
car; therefore, the defense offered the only evidence
available to support its theory of the case, the sworn
testimony of the defendant:
Q. What happened when you applied yom
brakes?
A. Well, as you know, the way people usually
drive, I slowed down. I let off the accelerator. I went to step on the brakes, first
slightly, in order just to slow me down
and I got no reaction. I stepped on them
harder, and there was still nothing there.
And I believe I was just surprised, kind
of stunned that they weren't taking. And
from there I leaned forward and with my
left foot I tried stepping on the emergency
brake, and there just- there wasn't time.
(R. 108).
It is evident that the jury believed the defendant's testimony regarding the sudden brake failure,
and in view of Instruction No. 10, the jury determined that Miss Patrakis could not have reasonably anticipated that the brakes would fail under those circumstances. Although the defendant testified that
the brakes had squeaked and somewhat grabbed
while she was running her errands prior to the acci5

dent, this was no indication that her brakes would
fail as they did. It was a question for the jury whether she was put on notice that her brakes would fail.
The evidence was clear that the defendant applied her
brakes soon enough to have stopped in time even in
the rain. She testified that she applied the brakes
lightly at about 150 feet and harder at 75 feet with
her vehicle going about 20 miles per hour at the time.
Appellant points out the fact that the
were checked by a garage on the Monday following
the accident and found to be in perfect working order,
and infers that this is evidence that the brakes were
not defective at the time of the accident. It is common
knowledge that wet brake linings will dry out. The
witnesses testified that they were at the scene of the
accident for 45 minutes to an hour (R. 111) and during this period the brakes would have an opportunity
to dry out. The investigating officer had Miss Patrakis pump the brakes and then allowed her to drin
home; therefore, the officer was aware of the fact
that wet brakes will dry out. In any event, the brakes
would be dry by the Monday following the accident
when they were inspected by the mechanic. The only
available evidence to show whether the brakes were
defective at the time of the accident was the testimony of the defendant. This evidence was offered by
the defense, and it was believed by the jury. The only
way one could probably get additional proof that wet
brakes caused the accident would be if a service station or garage were immediately adjacent to the scene
6

,if the accident and the car was taken in for an im-

mediate inspection.

Appellant has cited the case of Woods vs. GoodM'il, 55 ·wash. 2d 687, 349 P. 2d 731 (1960) as authority for the proposition that "brake failure" instruct ions are improper in any case other than failure due
to clefective design or construction. The Woods case
i1ffolved a brake "failure" due to the fact that the
motor was not running when the defendant applied
the power brakes. The court charged the defendant
with knowledge that, when the motor was not running, the brakes would not function.

In holding that it was prejudicial error to give
the "brake failure" instructions under that fact situation, the court ruled that a driver has a duty to be
sufficiently informed as to the operation and mechanism of her automobile.
The instructions were prejudicial because
thereby the jury were permitted to exculpate
the respondent from liability, if they found she
did not know that which she is charged in law
with knowing. 349 P. 2d at 734.
The Woods case is clearly distinguishable on its
facts. While the driver of an automobile may be
charged with the knowledge that the power brakes
on her car will not function when the motor is not
exrunning, this is a far different matter than
tent the braking efficiency of 'l new car might be affected by rainy weather.
Instruction No. 10 placec the burden of proof
7

upon the defendant 'to show that she "could not have
reasonably anticipated that the brakes would or
might not be effective in slowing or stopping her vehicle under all of the circumstances and conditions
which then and there existed." This was a heavy burden of proof, yet after all the evidence was in, the
jury was satisfied that Miss Patrakis could not have
reasonably anticipated her brakes would fail as they
did.
The question was properly submitted to the jury.
As stated in 10 A Blashfield Automobiles 481, the
general rule applicable to the case at hand is as follows:
Under proper allegations, the question of
defendant's negligence in regard to the condition and operating of brakes should generally
be submitted to the jury.
In Parker vs. Bridgeport Mach. Co., 91 S. W. 2d
807 (Tex. Civ. App., 1936), one of the questions was
whether the defendant was negligent in driving his
car while the brakes were frozen. The court considered the possible argument that it was inconsistent
for the jury to find that the defendant was not negligent on any of the grounds alleged in the plaintiff's
petition, and also to find that the accident was unavoidable. The jury had found that the brakes were
frozen, yet still brought in a finding of unavoidable
accident. The court did not feel that these findings
were inconsistent.
. . . notwithstanding the fact that in the
8

stress of weather which overtook the driver of
defendant's car as he traveled along the roadway and shortly before he reached the place
of the collision the brakes on his car became
frozen or partially frozen so as to prevent his
stopping his car quickly, the jury was justified
in finding that he was not negligent under all
of the circumstances disclosed by the record in
proceeding across the intersection with his
brakes in this condition. 91 S. W. 2d at 809.
Further support is found in Amelsburg vs. Lunning, 14 N. W. 2d 680 (Iowa, 1944), which was based on a fact situation very similar 'to the case at hand.
The plaintiff sought damages for personal injuries resulting from a collision at a road intersection. The evidence showed that the defendant had
driven his car through slush and muddy water the
day before the collision which, by reason of freezing
weather, caused the brakes to freeze. On the day of
the accident the defendant had driven only a short
distance before he reached the intersection where the
accident occurred, and had had no cause to use the
brakes.
The court held that whether the defendant was
negligent in failing to discover the condition of the
brakes was a question for the jury, not a question of
law for the court.
The court referred to the general rule as stated
in 5 Am. J ur. 643, §252 :
. . . where the brakes of an automobile
have previously functioned properly, but sud9

denly fail to respond, their failure does nu1
render the owner guilty of negligence ... un:
less he had knowledge of the defective condition.
Respondent submits that the question whether
Miss Patrakis was negligent in regard to the conclition and operation of her brakes was a question fur
the jury. Furthermore, Instructions 9 and 10 advised
the jury of the law applicable to the case; and, if any
thing, were favorable to the plaintiff in that they imposed a heavy burden of proof on the defendant.
Appellant contends that to allow the"brake failure" instructions to be given was tantamount to gi\'ing an "unavoidable accident" instruction which was
not warranted by the facts of the case. If appellant\
logic were followed to a conclusion, in every case in
which the court instructs the jury that unless the)·
find negligence, the defendant is not liable, one could
say that the court has given the jury an instruction
that is tantamount to an "unavoidable accident" instruction. In every case in which the defendant is no;
guilty of negligence the jury, in effect, makes a finding that it was unavoidable as to the defendant.
In any event, the "unavoidable accident" instruction which the Utah Supreme Court says shouk:
be given with caution and only where the evidencr
would justify it, was not given in this case. Thus tl1
problem of duplicity was not present. The reason tht
"unavoidable accident" instruction has come unclt
ffre is that:

1

1
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It compels the plaintiff to assume the
double burden of convincing the jury, first,
that the defendant was negligent and, second,
that there was no unavoidable accident. Woodho11se vs. Johnson, 20 Ut. 2d 210, 436 P. 2d
442, 453 (1968) (dissenting opinion)

Instructions 9 and 10 placed no such burden
upon the plaintiff in this case. If anything, the defendant under the unusually heavy burden of proving
that she could not have reasonably anticipated that
her brakes might fail as they did. It is apparent that
the defendant sustained her burden of proof to the
satisfaction of the jury.
Appellant has cited Woodhouse vs. Johnson, 20
Ut. 2d 210, 436 P. 2d 442 ( 1968), and there is some
pertinent language from the majority decision in
that case.
Ferreting the wheat from the chaff in the
plethora of requests from the contesting parties and 'fashioning instructions covering all
aspects of such a case in a manner fair to both
sides poses such a problem for the trial judge
that losing counsel can usually point to some
claimed error to use as a basis for argument
that the jury must have been misguided because he did not win.

* * *

This court has many times given expression to the importance of safeguarding the
right of trial by jury and the solidarity that
should be accorded a verdict after the parties
have been given a fair trial. Even-handed justice requires that this apply to all alike: To dell

fendant, as well as to plaintiffs. 436 P. 2d at

446

CONCLUSION

Respondent submits that the instructions were
as favorable for plaintiffs as could be expected in
connection with setting out the law and the duties of
a driver with respect to brakes; that there was suf.
ficient evidence to support the contention that the
defendant's brakes were defective at the time of the
accident; that the question whether defendant was
negligent was properly submitted to the jury; and,
therefore, the decision of the trial court denying
plaintiffs' motion for a new trial should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
L. L. SUMMERHAYS of
STRONG & HANNI
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant
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